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STATUTORY TREATMENT OF DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS UNDER THE KENTUCKY
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
The new corporation act provides, often for the first time, a
measure of statutory guidance for the significant area of corporate
law dealing with directors and officers. The act does not attempt
to include within its sections all of the law pertaining to directors
and officers. Accordingly, a number of judicial doctrines developed
over the years will remain unaffected by its provisions.
Most significantly, the act provides a legal framework for the
structure and operation of the basic management bodies of the
corporation. The general approach of the new law attempts to
find an appropriate balance between the interests of shareholders
and directors, directors and officers, majorities and minorities, and
large and small corporations. Consistent with the Model Act, the
Kentucky version is sympathetic to directors and majority interests,
although several provisions have been modified to strike a more
equitable balance for the rights of all parties.
This note will discuss the application of the new act to directors
and officers under six major topics: (1) the board of directors and
its members, (2) meetings of the board of directors, (8) directors'
management functions, (4) directors' fiduciary duties, (5) officers,
and (6) indemnification. Legislative history, previous statutes, and
existing case law will be cited where appropriate in an attempt to
make this note of benefit to the practitioner.
I. TEE Bo~mD OF Dncros Am rrs MEmmERS
A. Board of Directors-KRSA § 271A.175
1. Powers
Like the prior statute,' the new section provides that the manage-
ment of the corporation shall be vested in a board of directors.
However, as in the prior act, this grant of authority is not necessarily
one to be exercised exclusively by the board of directors. The new
act provides:
2
1Ky. Rv. STAT. § 271.845(1) (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.175 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KMSA].
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The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed3 by a
board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the
articles of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or im-
posed upon the board of directors by this Act shall be exercised or
performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall
be provided in the articles of incorporation.
The act, therefore, expressly permits an initial grant of authority
to persons or bodies other than the board, if such a provision is
included in the articles of incorporation.4 As this authority is included
in the articles, it appears to be an original structuring of power by
the incorporators rather than a delegation of power by the board.5
The statute is somewhat unclear in its use of the term "powers and
duties" as to whether the recipient of this authority will be allowed
to escape traditional director liability, or will be limited in his exercise
of director powers. However, the clear import of this sentence is
that the powers and duties are those "conferred or imposed upon the
board of directors by this Act," a phrase which is devoid of any
inherent limitations. The only limitations involved are those that
may be found in the articles that confer this authority. Thus, if the
provision in the articles confers or imposes less than the total powers
and duties of the board, there may be a portion of such power
remaining vested in the board. For this reason, if it is desirable
to use this device to confer authority on others besides the board,
the practitioner should be certain to make the article provision specific
enough to prevent a duality of function and broad enough to vest
all such power in the desired body.
The scope of this pre-structured grant of power should logically
follow the boundaries that exist in setting the limits on the powers
of the board of directors. Any function that could properly be
exercised by the board could likewise be exercised by the recipient
3It should be noted that the word "managed" is not defined in the statute.
This is in line with the philosophy of leaving the definition of management to the
courts to be applied in the context of specific factual situations and within the
framework of the traditional management functions. MODEL Bus. Corp. Acr ANN.
2D § 35 f1 2 (1971).
4 The reasoning behind this provision is discussed in MoDEL Bus. Corp. Acr
ANN. 2D § 35 ff 2 (1971). The primary purpose is to permit close corporations to
do under the law what they have been commonly doing in practice. The generality
of the provision permits almost complete flexibility in patterns of management,
with imposition of such controls as may be desired in individual cases. This
provision will be usefil not only to family-owned corporations but also to corporate
joint ventures. Note that the power of shareholders to assume managerial functions
in the close corporation is greatly enhanced.
5 Compare with KRSA § 271A.210 which is clearly a delegation of power by
the board to executive and other committees.
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of the power conferred by the articles.6 Existing case law on proper
director functions should retain its validity in this context.7 Thus,
it would appear to be possible to impose the total board powers
upon one designated in the articles.8 In such a case, while the board
would function as a "dummy," without powers, it would still be a
statutorily-required body.
The principal change from the prior law is that under the new
act, management duties can be conferred upon those who are not
directors, while previously, under KRS § 271.345(4)(d), the board
could only appoint executive committees of its own members to
perform management tasks. Furthermore, under the new act, the
dichotomy between discretionary and ministerial duties is not im-
portant where the actual board power has been granted to others.
The grant is, or can be, a total grant of power, thus encompassing
both discretionary and ministerial functions.
2. Qualifications
KRSA § 271A.175 further provides: "Directors need not be residents
of this state or shareholders of the corporation unless the articles of
6The committee hearings generally expressed the view that one exercising
director functions would not be insulated from traditional director liability. More
important, liability under the federal law was felt to be certain. IKzNrucxY LEGcS-
LAIvE RESEARcH COMMISSION, INFORmATIONAL BuLL. No. 88, LEGISLATIVE HEAR-
Io: CoRoRATiON LAw 66, 67 (1971) (comment of Mr. Shaikun) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE BEAniNG].
7See e.g., Chicago City Ry. v. Allerton, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233 (1874),
where the charter stated that the capital might be increased "at the pleasure of
the corporation" and that all corporate powers were vested in the board of direc-
tors. Without consulting the shareholders, the board of directors voted to increase
the capital stock beyond the limit fixed by the charter. In a shareholder suit to
enjoin the increase, it was held that the change contemplated was so fundamental
that it could not be made by the directors alone. The court stated that the
general power to perform all corporate acts refers to ordinary business transactions
of the corporation, and that such fundamental change cannot be made in the
absence of express or implied shareholder consent. See generally Taylor v.
Axton-Fischer Tobacco Co., 173 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1943), holding that when the
board made a resolution to retire all of the class A stock, what were potential
rights in class B stockholders became vested rights, and the board could not
modify the resolution to make class A retirement optional instead of mandatory,
thereby prejudicing the rights of class B stockholders. Kozy Theater Co. v.
Love, 231 S.W. 249 (Ky. 1921), holding that where directors constitute the
only stockholders and they informally authorize the president to sell all of the
corporate assets, the corporation is bound by the president's act; Caddy Oil Co.
v. Sommer 218 S.W. 288 (Ky. 1920); Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376
(Ky. 1917), stating that the legality of the acts of directors does not depend
upon the motive inducing them; Pittsburgh C.C. & S.L. Ry. v. Dodd, 72 S.W. 822
(Ky. 1903). In Burt v. The Irvine Co., 224 Cal. App.2d 50, 36 Cal. Rptr. 270
(1964), the court held that under West Virginia law the board of directors could
regulate the presence of strangers at a board meeting, including barring a director's
attorney. Note further collection of cases in MODEL Bus. Corn,. ACT ANN. 2U §
35 1 4.01(2) (1971).
8 See LEGISLATIVE HEARIc, supra note 6, at 65 (comment of Mr. Shaikun).
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incorporation or by-laws so require. The articles of incorporation or
by-laws may prescribe other qualifications for directors." This pro-
vision represents no significant change from prior Kentucky law. It
is identical to the Model Act and in line with the majority of juris-
dictions, particularly those that have revised their corporation acts
in recent years.9 Residency and shareownership requirements are
now thought to be of only marginal benefit to the modem corporation.
However, where such qualifications are deemed important, the new
act, like the old, provides considerable flexibility by allowing insertion
of these requirements into either the articles or the by-laws.
Significant by its absence from the act is the requirement that
directors must be either natural persons or of the age of legal majority.
Despite specific proposals to this effect at the public hearings, the
legislature has consciously decided to omit such a requirement from
the act.10 This policy decision is in harmony with the premise that
qualifications for directors are matters to be determined by the
shareholders and incorporators as the specific situation may dictate,
and not by the legislature in the form of blanket prohibitions on
director qualifications. Accordingly, other qualifications may be set
forth in the articles or by-laws; however, they will most certainly
be subject to judicial construction for possible unreasonable or
discriminatory restrictions."
3. Compensation of Directors
The last sentence of KRSA § 271A.175 provides: "The board of
directors shall have authority to fix the compensation of directors
unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation." This
9 For a case where the articles or by-laws do prescribe a shareownership
requirement, see Kaye v. Kentucky Pub. Elevator Co., 175 S.W.2d 142 (Ky.
1943); accord, Schmidt v. Mitchell, 41 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1897), holding that a
director may hold his stock as a trustee or have only legal title thereto, even for
the express and sole purpose of making him eligible, unless the situation was
brought about in futherance of a dishonest scheme concerning the management
or control of the corporation. See generally MODEL Bus. CoRnP. Act ANr. 2D § 35
f1 3.03 for a list of those states still retaining shareownership and residency require-
ments for directors.
10 See LEGIsLATrvE HEArUNG, supra note 6, at 68, for a discussion of the
effect of havin g a minor on the board of directors where a member of a large
corporate law firm and a corporate attorney for a large public-issue corporation
proposed that directors should be natural persons of 18 years of age or older.
Note also that the requirement that incorporators must be natural persons of
18 years or more under KRS § 271.025 is no longer applicable.
11 See e.g., Hempstead v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Hosp. Ass'n, 210 P.
482 (Kan. 1922), 30 A.L.R. 243, upholding a by-law provision that all trustees
must be of good moral character and invalidating the election of a man who had
been convicted of embezzlement and prosecuted for forgery.
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provision should alleviate the problems caused by the early common
law view that directors would be assumed to receive their compensa-
tion in the form of dividends and need not be separately compensated
for their duties as directors. 12 Note again the flexible approach toward
balancing the rights of directors and shareholders by the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in the articles." Even without statutory
authorization in Kentucky under the old law, the fixing of their own
salaries by directors has certainly been a common occurrence in
practice. Thus, the new act represents express authority for action
that may have been unlawful in the past.
It is not to be doubted, however, that the concept of the director
as a fiduciary will operate as a meaningful check on the fairness and
reasonableness of the compensation.' 3 The traditional problems in
this area have centered around director compensation for services
rendered outside the scope of the director's office,14 the reasonable-
ness and burden of proof of the reasonableness of salaries of directors
who are officers,' 5 the voting by directors on their own salaries, 16 and
12 For an excellent statement of the common law rule see Nat'l Loan & Inv.
Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 F. 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1899); Lofland v. Cahall, 118 A. 1
(Del. 1922); Godley v. Crandall & Godley, 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914).
IS See Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packare & Wheat, Inc., 195 N.E. 769 (Mass.
1935). See generally Klaus, Corporate Quandry: Search for an Adequate Method
of Executive Compensation, 4 TULSA L.J. 197 (1967); Brodsky, What Is Reason-
able Compensation? 14 TUL. TAx INST. 389 (1965); Edwards, Directors Re-
muneration, 117 NEw L.J. 147 (1967).
14 See Paine v. Ky. Ref. Co., 167 S.W. 375 (Ky. 1914), holding that unless
compensation is provided for in the charter or by-laws, directors are not entitled
to compensation for services within the line of their official duties. But, where the
services are not within the line of their official duties and it may be inferred
from the circumstances that both parties understood the directors were to be
compensated, this rule does not apply. A director acting as an arbitrator in a
dispute between the corporation and its general manager is performing services
outside his regular duties and is entitled to reasonable compensation. Compare
Winberg v. Camp Taylor Dev. Co., 95 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1936); Johnson v.
Tn-Union Oil & Gas Co., 129 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1939). Note further collection of
cases in 3 P-H CoRe. (Ky.) ff 35 (1972).
15 See Beha v. Martin 171 S.W. 393 (Ky. 1914), holding that where the
directors own a majority of the stock and vote salaries for themselves as officers,
the salaries must be reasonable according to the services performed. The objecting
minority stockholders bear the burden of proving that the salaries are unreason-
able. Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942), stated that the court will determine and allow
reasonable compensation for services for which shareholders have benefited, despite
proof of dereliction of fiduciary duty. The court will compel restitution of
previously paid excessive amounts. Contra, Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th
Cir. 1959), which places the burden of proof on the directors.
16 See Beha v. Martin, 171 S.W. 393 (Ky. 1914), stating that each director
must refrain from voting on his compensation and his presence cannot be counted
in determining a quorum. The Court suggested that the split-resolution technique
isa proper means for granting director compensation, while the single resolution
will be held invalid. Note that these requirements are now of doubtful validity
in light of the new provision, KRSA § 271A.205.
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the right of the corporation to commissions paid to directors.17 It
now appears that the distinction between services rendered in the
regular line of duty and those rendered outside the scope of the
director's normal functions is of slight significance in determining the
director's right to compensation.' 8 The distinction may still be useful,
however, in determining the reasonableness of such compensation.
As KRSA § 271A.20519 now removes most of the procedural
obstacles concerning transactions with the corporation in which
directors are interested parties, the director compensation section
should be read in light of this new section for both substantive and
procedural guidance. Read collectively, these sections allow directors
to be compensated without the previous technical restrictions, but
such compensation must be reasonable. Since KRSA § 271A.175
merely gives the directors power to fix their own compensation with-
out specifically treating the self-dealing problem, it is important in
order to preserve the comprehensive nature of the act that the sub-
stantive spirit of KRSA § 271A.205 be construed to encompass the
director compensation section. Accordingly, the function of the
courts in this area will be of no small significance.
B. Number, Election, and Term of Directors-KRSA § 271A180
1. Number of Directors
The new act provides that "the board of directors of a corpora-
tion shall consist of one or more members."20 This provision, like the
whole section, is identical to that of the Model Act,21 and identical
in substance to the prior law. 22 As of 1969, Kentucky was one of
several states allowing the minimum number of directors to be one
or more.23 The new Kentucky statute, like the previous one, is con-
sistent with the trend away from the minimum-of-three requirement.
17See Paducah Land, Coal & Iron Co. v. Hayes, 24 S.W. 287 (Ky. 1893),
holding that where the vendor of land to a corporation in return for corporate
stock gave back to the directors a part of the consideration, the corporation was
entitled to the benefits of this stock.
18 But see Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1947),
where the court after first stating the general rule that "retroactive" compensation
to directors is invalid as a gift of corporate assets, upheld a payment of retroactive
compensation that bore a reasonable relation to extra services rendered and was
approved by a majority of the shareholders.
19 This is the section concerning director conflicts of interest. See text and
accompanying notes, infra, for a fall discussion of this provision.
20 KRSA § 271A.180.
21 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Conp. Acr § 36 (rev. ed. 1969).
22 KRS § 271.345(1).
23For a list of the states and their required minimum number of directors,
see MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2D § 36 ff 3.03 (1971).
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A growing number of states are adopting the Model Act approach
while others are following a similar approach which allows less than
three directors where there are fewer than three shareholders.
24
Kentucky has wisely decided that it is more advantageous to all con-
cerned to recognize the common practice of "one-man" management
in close corporations than to insist that a sole stockholder in a close
corporation find two friends to serve nominatively as "dummies" on
the board.
Some concern has arisen in the past over the conflict between
KRS § 271.345(1), which required a minimum of one director, and
KRS § 271.345(4)(c), which listed the requirements for a quorum at a
board meeting. The latter statute provided that a majority of the
board constituted a quorum which, inter alia, could not be less than
two directors.25 This inconsistency has been resolved by the quorum
provision of the new act.
26
It is further provided by KRSA § 271A.180 that "the number of
directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner provided in, the articles
of incorporation or the by-laws, except as to the number constituting
the initial board of directors, which number shall be fixed by the
articles of incorporation." The flexibility in this approach is apparent;
no maximum number of directors is prescribed, and ample opportu-
nity exists for granting power to either the board or the shareholders,
with additional room for checks and balances between the two
holders of power.
The shareholders may retain the power to set the number of
directors by providing for a specific number in the articles. As only
the shareholders may amend the articles,27 they thereby can maintain
absolute control over the number of directors. For those corporations
desiring a more flexible approach, the articles may provide the manner
in which the number is determined, without stating a specific number.
This would allow the board to set the number but would require it
to do so in the manner set out in the articles. One variation would
prescribe a range or sliding scale for the number of directors, yet
allow the board to operate freely within that range.
28
24 Id.
25 It is generally felt that the "nor less than two" requirement of the prior
statute was simply an error that was not corrected when the minimum number of
directors was reduced from three to one. LEGIsLATiVE HEAnING, supra note 6, at
69 (comment of Mr. Shaikun).
26 See generally the quorum provision, KRSA § 271A.200.
2 7 However, where no shares have been issued, the board may by resolution
amend the articles without a shareholder vote. KRSA § 271A.295.2 8 Such a system could adversely affect the cumulative voting rights of
minority stockholders in some circumstances. See, e.g., Stone v. Auslander, 28
Misc. 2d 384, 212 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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On the other hand, the power to fix the number may be vested
largely in the board subject to certain restrictions for the protection
of shareholders. Where the number is fixed in the by-laws, 29 the
power of the board will be enhanced. This conclusion follows nat-
urally from the right of the board to adopt the initial by-laws and
to amend or repeal existing by-laws. 30 However, the fact that board
action is subject to repeal or change by action of the shareholders,31
operates as an effective check on arbitrary or irresponsible acts of
the board. Note also that the power to amend or repeal by-laws
may be reserved completely to the shareholders at the outset by so
providing in the articles. One possibility would be to set a maximum
and minimum number in the articles, permitting the board to operate
freely within this range in the framework of amnding the by-laws, with
the action of the board subject to change or repeal by the share-
holders. Numerous other hybrids are possible, subject only to the
needs of the situation and the ingenuity of corporate counsel.32
The act additionally makes it clear that proceedings under this
section are not proper for the removal of existing directors, by pro-
viding that "no decrease shall have the effect of shortening the term
of any incumbent director." The procedures for removal of a director
are expressly set forth in a subsequent section of the act.33
While KRSA § 271A.180 does not represent a significant depar-
ture from prior law,34 a greater flexibility of approach is indicated,
especially for the close corporation. For a proper understanding of
the possibilities and limitations in this area, the interrelation of this
section and the sections on amending the articles35 and by-laws36
must be considered.
2. Initial Board of Directors
The number of members of the first board of directors must be
fixed in the articles of incorporation. This represents only a slight
change from prior law which allowed the number to be fixed either
in the articles or the by-laws.37 In addition, the names and addresses
of the first board must be stated in the articles. This is somewhat
29 It is generally considered cheaper and easier to amend the by-laws than
the articles.
30 KRSA § 271A.135.
31 Id.3 2 See generally P-H Coiu. I1 1503 (1972).
33 KRSA § 271A.195.
34KRS § 271.345(1), (4).
35 KRSA § 271A.295.
36 KRSA § 271A.135.3 7 KRS § 271.345(4).
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different from prior law in that the role of the incorporators is now
greatly diminished. The corporation will have a fixed number of
directors from its inception, and the persons constituting the board
will be ascertained and vested with power from the outset. Previously,
there was no board until it was elected at the first meeting of share-
holders, a situation which could give rise to problems.3
8
The term of the initial directors will last until the first annual
shareholder meeting, and until their successors have been elected
and qualified. During this period, the initial board will hold the
same powers, rights, and duties as the subsequently elected boards.
3. Election
At the first annual meeting of shareholders and at each annual
meeting thereafter the shareholders shall elect directors to hold
office until the next succeeding annual meeting, except in case of
the classification of directors as permitted by this Act.39
It is, of course, a longstanding rule that stockholders have the inherent
power to elect the members of the board by a majority vote,40 and
the above section represents no change from prior law. Like the
prior law, the new act is silent on certain areas that have given rise
to litigation in the past. Existing case law developed under the prior
statute may still retain some validity with respect to interpretation
of the new section. In this regard, litigation has arisen in Kentucky
pertaining to the time when a director accepts his election and
begins his duties;4' the failure to elect the required number of
directors; 42 the formality required for director elections; 43 the effect
38 See, e.g., Lebus v. Stansifer, 157 S.W. 727 (Ky. 1913), holding that the
articles could not allow the incorporators to act as the board of directors for a
limited time without any action of the shareholders.
39 KRSA § 271A.180.
40 See Beardsley v. Johnson, 121 N.Y. 224, 24 N.E. 380 (1890), and other
cases cited in P-H CoR. ff 1504 (1972).41 See Cumberland Publishing Co. v. Adams Real Estate Corp., 432 S.W.2d
808 (Ky. 1968), holding that a duly elected director accepts his office by the
simple act of serving; ef. Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land & Lumber Co., 83
S.W. 599 (Ky. 1904).4 2 See Gilchrist v. Collopy, 82 S.W. 1018 (Ky. 1904), holding that where the
ownership of stock is evenly divided and the two interests have a working agree-
ment whereby in alternate years one elects two and the other, three directors,
an election attended by only one of the interests will not be held void because
it resulted in the election of only two directors pursuant to the agreement. Note
that the case cited here and those cited in the succeeding six footnotes are
collected in P-H Cop. ff 1504 (1972) and 3 P-H CoRP. (Ky.) § 86 (1972). See
also Drake v. Herndon, 91 S.W. 674 (Ky. 1906).43 See Beba v. Martin, 171 S.W. 393 (Ky. 1914) holding that where the
stockholders elected persons to offices to which they were eligible only if directors,
and the affairs of the corporation were generally conducted informally, such action
indicated that they elected such persons as directors also.
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of the election of ineligible candidates and the status and effect of de
facto directors. 44 Litigation arising in other states which may be of
help in interpreting the new act involves the postponement of a
stockholders' meeting by directors for an indefinite period;45 the
power of a president to adjourn a stockholders' meeting before the
election of directors; 46 and the validity of stockholder agreements to
elect certain persons as directors47 or to elect only "dummy" direc-
tors.
48
4. Term
The term of office set forth by the act is clearly one year, as it runs
from election until the next succeeding annual meeting, except where
directors are classified. This represents no change from the prior
statute. The director's term extends "until his successor shall have
been elected and qualified." Therefore, litigation may arise where
the new directors are not elected on time or are not qualified.
49
C. Classification of Directors-KRSA § 271A.185
1. The Staggered Board
Like the previous statute,50 the new act5' permits classification of
directors by the use of what is commonly called the staggered board.
Here also, the Model Act has been adopted in its entirety. The
principal change from prior law is that classification is not permitted
unless the board consists of nine or more members. This requirement
44 See Schmidt v. Mitchell, 41 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1897), holding that where an
ineligible candidate is elected, he is not a de facto director, nor are the votes cast
for him deemed lost so as to cause the election of one who received a minority
of votes. Contra, Porter's Adm'r. v. Dulin Oil Co., 45 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1932),
holding that even if there is some question about eligibility, the directors become
de facto directors and their acts while in office cannot be attacked in a collateral
proceeding. Cf. O'Hara v. Williamstown Cemetery Co., 119 S.W. 234 (Ky. 1909),
holding that where there were no de jure directors, the Court could require the
corporation to call a meeting for electing directors.45 See Silverman v. Gilbert, 185 So.2d 373 (La. 1966).46 See In re Dollinger Corp., 51 Misc.2d 802, 274 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
47 See Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
48 See Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947), invalidating such an
agreement.49 See Lincoln Court Realty Co. v. Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co.,
185 S.W. 156 (Ky. 1916), holding that where the resignations of directors,
effective upon acceptance, were not accepted, the men remained as directors;
La Rue v. Bank of Columbus, 178 S.W. 1033 (Ky. 1915), holding that where
the new directors had not been elected and qualified, the acts of the old directors
were valid.
59 KRS § 271.345(4).
51 KRSA § 271A.185.
[Vol. 61
NoTE: DmEcroRs AND OFFacms
will effectively negate the possibility of a small corporation's using
classification because most small corporations neither need nor desire
a board of this size.52 However, the effect of this requirement on the
large or public issue corporation should be minimal.
Classification under the new act must be provided for in the
articles of incorporation, while previously a provision in either the
articles or by-laws would have been sufficient authorization. As the
board generally has the power to amend the by-laws, the new section
will prevent the board from authorizing classification where there
is no provision in the articles allowing classification. Theoretically,
this is a sound restriction consistent with the inherent power of the
shareholders to elect directors.
Directors may be divided into either two or three classes, with
each class to be as nearly equal in number as possible. Classification
is not permitted before the first annual meeting of shareholders. At
the first annual meeting, the directors are divided into two classes;
the term of the first class will expire at the next annual meeting
while the term of the second class will expire at the second annual
meeting. The same terms are set where there are three classes,
except that the term of the third class will expire at the third annual
meeting. At each annual meeting following the first meeting, the
shareholders will elect the same number of directors as there are
directors with terms expiring. Directors elected after the first meeting
will serve two-year terms if there are two classes, or three-year terms
if there are three classes. Three years is thus the maximum term for
any director, but, of course, he may be re-elected.
The theory behind the staggered board is that holdovers from the
existing board can assure a continuity of management that is vital
for a successful corporation. Additionally, there may be some merit
to the premise that a staggered board will protect against sudden,
irresponsible changes by dissident groups. 3 On the other hand,
several criticisms may be directed against this device. The most
common is that this technique is used to perpetuate the control of
present management because it takes two or three years for a whole
new board to be elected; 54 the "ins" can effectively use this extra
time to get back into favor with the shareholders. Another objection
is that management will be insulated from shareholder control and
not responsive to shareholder demands.
52 SeLEGISLATIV HEARiNG, supra note 6, at 65.5 3 Monar Bus. Co". Aar AN. 2D § 37 f1 2 (1971).
64 Note, however, that the whole board can be removed without cause at
one time under KIRSA § 271A.195, a fact which may tend to blunt this criticism.
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2. Effect on Cumulative Voting
The objection that a staggered board defeats the guarantee of
cumulative voting is certainly a matter of proper concern in Kentucky.
Cumulative voting is guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution,55 and
consequently, and statute abrogating this right will be invalid. There
are cumulative voting provisions in both the prior 56 and presentV7
statutes, but as of now, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has not con-
sidered the effect of a staggered board on cumulative voting. Ac-
cordingly, the decisions of other jurisdictions may be relevant in
determining the constitutionality of the staggered board.
Two lines of cases have emerged. In Wolfson v. Avery,55 an
Illinois statute similar to the new Kentucky classification statute was
declared unconstitutional as repugnant to the Illinois constitutional
guarantee of cumulative voting. In this case, the court looked to the
intent of the framers and found that the purpose of cumulative voting
was to guarantee a greater proportional representation to minority
interests. Thus, the statute could not stand.
However, in Janney v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 9 a clas-
sification statute was found by the Pennsylvania court not to be in-
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting.
The court admitted that the staggered board device could affect
cumulative voting, but suggested that other devices were available
to minority interests which could be used to dilute the voting control
of the majority. The court construed the constitutional phrase "dis-
tribute them upon two or more candidateF" (emphasis added) to mean
that the framers did not intend to insure the success of cumulative
voting, but only to give minority interests the opportunity for greater
55 Ky. CONST. § 207 provides:
In all elections for directors or managers of any corporation, each share-
holder shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggregate as he
shall be entitled to vote in said company under its charter, multiplied by
the number of directors or managers to be elected at such election; and
each shareholder may cast the whole number of votes, either in person or
by proxy, for one candidate, or distribute such votes among two or more
candidates, and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any
other manner.
However, see Farmers No. 4, Inc. v. Lexington Tobacco Board of Trade, 461
S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1971) where cumulative voting was not extended to members
of a non-stock, non-proft corporation. See also In re Am. Elevator & Machine
Co., 73 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Ky. 1947), allowing a corporation to issue non-voting
preferred stock.
56 KRS § 271.315(2).
57 KRSA § 271A.165(4).
58 126 N.E.2d 701 (111. 1955). Accord, People ex rel. Syphers v. McCune,
101 S.E.2d 834 (W. Va. 1958).
59 128 A.2d 76 (Pa. 1956).
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proportional representation. The court distinguished the Wolfson
case on these grounds.
The Kentucky constitutional provision also uses the term "can-
didate" which was important in the analysis of the Janney case. Note
that the intent of the framers in their debates and discussions was
a highly significant factor in both cases. One writer suggests that the
debates on this section of our constitution reveal that the framers
intended only to provide an opportunity for, and not a guarantee of,
greater proportional representation.6" If so, the new statute would
probably be constitutional. It may also be significant that since
staggered boards must have at least nine members, and at least three
will be elected at one time, cumulative voting is not affected as
much as it would be where fewer directors are elected. However, we
must await a court of appeals decision to this effect before the matter
is resolved.6 '
D. Vacancies on the Board of Directors-KIRSA § 271A.190
As the prior statute 2 specifically vested the power to fill vacancies
in the remaining members of the board, the new statute63 does not
effect a great substantive change in this area. As before, this power
may not be limited by provisions in either the articles or the by-laws
but rests principally with the board of directors.64 However, under
close statutory scrutiny, the use of the word "may" in the new section
pertaining to the directors' power to fill vacancies, should be con-
trasted with the word "shall" in the prior act. The word "shall"
confers sole authority on the board, while the word "may" implies
a sharing of this power with the shareholders even in the absence of
a provision in the articles or by-laws. Therefore, in those jurisdictions
holding that the shareholders have inherent authority to elect
directors, the new act may not preclude the possibility of a special
shareholder meeting to fill vacancies on the board.6 5 Of course,
60 See Comment, Cumulative Voting-Removal, Reduction and Classification
of Corporate Boards, 22 U. Cm. L 1 Rv. 751, 758 (1955); see generally Ham,
The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L.J. 125, 136 (1961).
61 For prior rulings of the Court of Appeals on cumulative voting, see Proctor
Coal Co. v. Finley, 33 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1895), holding that where cumulative
voting was not used in previous elections, it was not precluded in subsequent
elections; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 41 S.W. 929 (Ky. 1897), stating that cumulative
voting was optional with the stockholders as long as they were not denied that
right.
62IRS § 271.345(4)(a).
o3 1PSA § 271A.190.
6 4 MODEL Bus. CotP. Acr ANN. 2D § 38 ff 2 (1971).
65 See Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
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without such a special meeting the remaining board members will
fill the vacancy.66
The new section eliminates the procedural requirement that a
quorum of the entire board be present at any meeting to Rl vacancies
by providing that a vacancy may be filled "by the affirmative vote of
a majority of the remaining directors though less than a quorum of
the board of directors." This has been a troublesome area in the
past where courts have held that a majority of the remaining members
did not constitute a quorum and that elections to fill vacancies by
less than a quorum of the entire board were invalid.67 Now, hypo-
thetically, two of the three remaining members of a five-man board,
would constitute a quorum for filling the two vacancies. The purpose
of this provision is to allow the corporation to operate with a full
board without the expense and delay incident to holding a special
meeting of shareholders.
68
Previously, the term of the director elected to fill the vacancy
continued until his successor was elected by the shareholders at
the annual meeting or at a special meeting called for that purpose.
Under the new act, the term continues for the unexpired portion of
the previous director's term. In most cases, the result will be the
same under either statute, with the maximum term one year. How-
ever, under the new provision, where there is a staggered board with
terms of three years, the newly elected director in serving his pre-
decessor's term, could serve up to the three-year maximum. This
result was not possible under the previous statute.
The most significant change from prior law is that under the new
section the directors are able to create vacancies by expanding the
size of the board and then filling these vacancies. Previously, no
specific authorization existed for this practice, which gave substantial
doubt to its legality. The new section has the dual effect of enhancing
the director's management function while diminishing the control of
the corporation by the shareholders. This is characteristic of the type
of provision which provides the brand of flexibility that appears
attractive to corporations deciding whether to incorporate in Kentucky
or another state. The practice may seem fraught with opportunity
66 Note that the special meeting was also available under the prior law but
such action was to elect a successor to the member elected by the board, and did
not infringe upon the board's right to fill the vacancy until the shareholders acted,
either at an annual or special meeting.
67 See McCleary's v. John S. McCleary, Inc., 119 A. 551 (Del. Ch. 1923);
Tomlinson v. Loew s Inc., 134 A.2d 518 (Del. Ch. 1957), aff'd, 185 A.2d 136
(Del. 1957); and further collection of cases cited in Monr. Bus. CoRP. ACr ANN.
2D § 38 U 4.03(2) (1971).
6 8 MoDL Bus. Conp. Aar AN. 2D § 38 ff 2 (1971).
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for abuse, but this contingency is counterbalanced to some extent by
a restriction of the terms of these newly created directorships to the
next election by the shareholders.
The act does not deal specifically with the problems resulting
from unfilled directorships,69 removal vacancies,70 and resignations,71
but such events are probably included within the general scope of
the section. Hopefully the courts will not be long in clearing up the
ambiguities remaining.
E. Removal of Directors-KRSA § 271A.195
This section of the new act 72 delineates a substantial change from
prior law. Previously, Kentucky bad no provision relating to the
removal of directors either with or without cause. It is arguable
whether the former section stating that officers and directors stood
in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation 3 also carried the
implication that directors could be removed for breach of this
duty.74 However, most courts have consistently held that share-
holders have the inherent power to remove directors for cause.7 5
The real problems arose where a director was removed by the
shareholders without cause or when a suit sought to have the court
remove a director.
The above problems are now largely eliminated by KRSA §
271A.195(1) which provides:
At a meeting of shareholders called expressly for that purpose,
directors may be removed in the manner provided in this section.
Any director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with
9 See Harris v. Brown, 6 F.2d 922 (W.D. Ky. 1925) holding that where
the shareholders had failed to fill two directorships on the board, the board had
no right to fill them even though the articles gave the board the right to fill
vacancies until the next annual election.
70Note that while the shareholders have the right to elect directors, the
removal section, KRSA § 271A.195, is silent upon whether the shareholders may
elect the successor to a removed director. It may be that the shareholders have
the right to do so, but in the absence of such action, a vacancy is created within
the meaning of the principle section, allowing the board to fill this vacancy. Of
course, where the whole board is removed, the shareholders will have to 0the
vacancies.
7' See Seal of Cold Mining Co. v. Slater, 161 Cal. 621, 120 P. 15 (1911),
holding the board had the power to accept a director's resignation and elect his
successor. See also Mayo v. Interment Properties, Inc., 53 Cal. App.2d 654, 128
P.2d 417 (1942).
72 KRSA § 271A.195. This is substantially similar to the Model Act section.
73 KRS § 271.365 (1971).
74Se LEGISLATIVE BEAnING, supra note 6, at 66 (remark of Mr. Shaikum
suggesting this possibility).
75 See Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590, 48 A.L.R.2d 604
(1954); Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. oh. 1957).
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or without cause, by a vote of the holders of a majority of the
shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors (emphasis
added).
Cause is thus no longer a requirement for removal in accordance with
the theory that, as the shareholders are the owners of the corporation,
they should have complete power to determine who will manage the
corporation. The propriety of a director's conduct is unimportant.
The sole determining factor is whether a majority of the shareholders
desire to remove the director.76
Most courts have held that where a director is to be removed
for cause he must be given notice of the charges, a reasonable time
to prepare his defense, and an opportunity to be heard before the
vote. 7 The new act does not specifically deal with a director's right
to a hearing, but as cause is no longer required, it may be fairly
implied that this right has been abrogated. Since this power is vested
solely in the shareholders, such a conclusion would be consistent with
the nature of the power.
The question of removal may be presented for action by the share-
holders only at a meeting called for that purpose. Taken literally,
this would appear to preclude removal at the regular annual meetings,
but it may be possible to circumvent this restriction by specifically
calling a meeting for the purpose of removal, which either precedes
or follows the annual meeting.
The entire board or any member thereof may be removed in this
fashion. This provision is highly significant in that it strongly pre-
serves the ability of the shareholders to act swiftly and decisively in
bringing about changes in management. It also facilitates an effective
shift in control when all or a controlling block of stock is sold to
third parties. The new owners may assume almost immediate control
without the bother of the previous technical obstacles. A simple
majority vote is all that is required.
The only apparent restrictions upon the removal power are
found in subsections (2) and (3) of KRSA § 271A.195. Subsection
(2) protects the right of cumulative voting, and is probably necessary
to prevent any constitutionally proscribed abuse of the cumulative
voting right. Where less than the entire board is to be removed, this
subsection operates to insure that "no one of the directors may be
removed if the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to
elect him if then cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board
76 MODE L Bus. Co.p. ACT ANN. 2D § 39 f1 2 (1971).
77 See, e.g., State v. Brast, 127 S.E. 507 (W. Va. 1925).
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of directors, or, if there be classes of directors, at an election of the
class of directors of which he is a part." This provision does not
apply if the entire board is to be removed, but it is effective in
preventing the majority from removing a minority director and
frustrating the constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting. Sub-
section (3) applies where directors are classified by the classification
of shares, as opposed to classification by term which is covered in
subsection (2). Subsection (3) logically restricts the removal power
to the holders of the class of shares from which the particular director
is elected, rather than allowing shares of all classes to be voted.
Thus, Class A shareholders cannot participate in a vote to remove
a Class B director. The Class B director can be removed only by a
majority vote of the outstanding Class B shares.
II. MEEnNGs oF Tm Bomiw OF DmucroRs
A. Quorum of Directors-KRSA § 271A.200
1. Number
The new act7" provides that a majority of the directors fixed in
the by-laws or articles constitutes a quorum for the transaction of
business unless a greater number is required by the articles or by-
laws. With some modification, the traditional common law require-
ment that a majority of the directors shall constitute a quorum79 has
been retained. The majority provision was also the basic guideline
to be followed in the previous statute.80 However, the principal dif-
ferences between the new act and the old are found in the qualifying
phrases of this general guideline.
The prior law stated that a majority of the directors constituted
a quorum unless the by-laws provided a different number, which in
no case could be less than one-third the total number of directors,
nor less than two directors. As previously stated, the "nor less than
two" requirement was generally felt to be an error that was not
corrected when the minimum number of directors was decreased
from three to one.8 ' The significant feature of the prior act that is
absent from the new law is the provision allowing less than a majority
to constitute a quorum if so provided in the by-laws, subject to the
one-third minimum. Thus, the less-than-majority-quorum provision
78 KRSA § 271A.200. This section is identical to ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. Cor.
Acr § 40 (rev. ed. 1969).
79See Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 218 S.W. 288 (Ky. 1920).
80 KRS § 271.345(4)(c).
81 See LE:ISLATrvE HEAxING, supra note 6, at 69 (remark of Mr. Shaikun).
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has been consciously omitted from the new section, despite a pro-
posal at the public hearings to retain this feature of the previous
act.82 The minimum number of directors now required for a quorum
is a majority of the total number, with no downward adjustment
allowed in either the articles or by-laws. This is one of the few
sections of the new act to be criticized as taking away some of the
flexibility that existed under the previous law.
It is quite conceivable that the seeming rigidity of this require-
ment may provide an obstacle to prompt and effective board action
where several of the directors live at distant places or are simply
unable to attend a meeting for any number of legitimate reasons.
However, consistent with the comprehensive nature of the Model Act,
there are adequate remedies for this situation. These remedies may
be found in the sections authorizing the designation of executive
committees83 and allowing action to be taken informally without a
meeting.
84
With regard to upward revision of the quorum number, there is
no similar limitation. Either the articles or the by-laws may provide
for a greater than majority quorum requirement under the new act
The number may range anywhere from a majority to unanimous
attendance. While the previous statute did not expressly authorize
such an upward revision, it did allow a number other than a majority
to be specified in the by-laws, with upward revision generally thought
to be included within the scope of the provision. This part of the
new statute is of special significance to the close corporation where
the articles may be constructed to extend substantial protection to
minority interests.85 A unanimous quorum requirement coupled with
the constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting could provide
tremendous leverage for the minority interest in a close corporation.
The drafters of the Model Act have construed "number of direc-
tors" to mean the total authorized number of directors as fixed by
the by-laws or by the articles if there is no by-law provision." This
could present a potential problem if one or several of the directors
were not presently in office and a quorum could not be obtained.
However, this undesirable situation was prudently anticipated by the
drafters in the vacancy section, KRSA § 271A.190, which permits a
majority of the remaining directors to fill vacancies though less than
82 Id. at 69 (proposals of Mr. Shaikun and Mr. Greenebaum).
83 KRSA § 271A.210.
84 KRSA § 271A.220.
85 See MODEL Bus. CoRnP. ACr ANN. 2D § 40 II 2 (1971).
So Id.
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a quorum exists. Nevertheless, these vacancies must be filled to
allow the board to act if a quorum is otherwise unobtainable.
2. Vote to Constitute an Act of the Board
KRSA § 271A.200 further provides: "The act of a majority of the
directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be
the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater number
is required by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." Thus,
an act of the board is accomplished by a majority vote of the quorum
present.8 7 This is consistent with the previous statute.8 8 It is possible
to provide in either the articles or by-laws a specified voting require-
ment greater than a majority, including unanimous voting, on all or
any specified questions. This represents an additional device for the
potential use of minority interests in the close corporation.8 9
Existing case law in certain areas not specifically treated by the
new act may retain part or all of its prior validity. Some examples
pertaining at least tangentially to this section are: the prohibition
against directors voting by proxy;90 the area of business judgment
and discretion traditionally allowed the board;91 and the usual re-
luctance of the courts to interfere with the board's management
function.92
B. Organizational Meeting of Directors-KRSA § 271A.285
Previously, two organizational meetings were required of every
newly formed corporation. First, there was the initial meeting of
the shareholders who elected the first board of directors, adopted
the by-laws unless this function was granted to the directors by the
articles, and transacted such other business as was stated in the notice
of the meeting.9 3 Then followed a meeting of the first board of
87See Paducah & M11. Ferry Co. v. Robertson, 171 S.W. 171 (Ky. 1914),
holding that the act of less than a quorum at a meeting of the board cannot bind
the corporation.
88 KRS § 271.345(4) (c).
89 This section relegates to merely historical significance cases such as
Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829, 159 A.L.R. 280 (1945),
holding invalid a unanimous vote-requirement for director action.
90 See Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917), stating that
directory could not vote by proxy.
91 See Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dodd, 72 S.W. 822 (Ky. 1903),
stating that the management of the affairs of the corporation, involving the
exercise of judgment and policy, is committed to the board of directors by law;
accord, Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 218 S.W. 288 (Ky. 1920).
0
2 See Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 173 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1943),
holding that the action of the board when exercised in good faith and not in
fraud of the rights of stockholders would not be interfered with by the courts;
accord, Graham v. McAdoo, 123 S.W. 260 (Ky. 1909).93 KRS § 271.345(2).
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directors who adopted the by-laws if the articles so provided, elected
officers, and transacted such other business as properly came before
the meeting.94 Under the new act,95 only one such organizational
meeting is required, the initial meeting of the board of directors.
After the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the directors
are prepared to proceed with all facets of the management of the
corporation.96 This result is principally due to the sections of the
new act providing that the first directors are named in the articles
9T
and empowering the board of directors to adopt the initial by-laws.98
Thus, at the organizational meeting, the board will adopt the by-laws,
elect officers, and transact such other business as may come before
the meeting.99
The meeting will be held at the call of a majority of the directors
named in the articles. The directors calling this meeting must give
at least three days' notice by mail to all named directors, stating the
time and place of the meeting. Previously, only one day's notice was
required. Such notice, however, may be waived if a written waiver
is signed either before or after the time stated in the notice by the
person or persons entitled to such notice.100 The prior statute simply
stated that "such call and notice shall not be necessary if all directors
are shown by the minutes of such meeting to have been present
thereat." 01
C. Place and Notice of Directors' Meeting-KRSA § 271A.215
KRSA § 271A.215(1)102 is substantially similar to previous law l03 in
providing that either regular or special meetings of the board of
directors may be held either within or without this state. No statutory
limitation is put upon the designation of the place for directors'
94 KRS § 271.345(3).
95 KRSA § 271A.285. This section is identical to ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 57 (rev. ed. 1969).
96 Where for convenience, secrecy, or other reasons, "dummy" directors are
named in the articles, the latter may act upon routine matters such as adoption of
by-laws or election of officers, but basic questions such as the authorization of
employment contracts or the valuation of property or services to be accepted as
consideration for the issuance of shares should not be made the responsibility of
such directors. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar ANN. 2D § 57 II 2 (1971).
97KRSA § 271A.270(1)(j).
98KRSA § 271A.135(1).
99With regard to the actual conduct of the meeting, note that Roberts Rules
of Order do not apply unless the corporation adopts them, usually in a by-law
provision. LEGISLA=TVE HEAR=G, supra note 6, at 78.
100 See KRSA § 271A.660.
101 KRS § 271.345(3).
102 This provision is identical to ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 43 (rev.
ed. 1969).
103 KRS § 271.345(4)(b).
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meetings, 04 but it may be helpful to designate a particular place for
regular meetings in a by-law provision to provide some measure of
consistency for this important procedural matter. The statute like-
wise makes no attempt to regulate the time when the regular meeting
should be held, but this also should be incorporated into a by-law
provision which can accommodate the convenient attendance of all
directors.
KRSA § 271A.215(2) deals generally with notice and waiver of
notice for both regular and special meetings of the board. Regular
meetings may be held with or without notice as provided in the by-
laws. Thus, the act specifically defers the questions of whether notice
is desirable, and if so, how much, to the drafters of the by-laws who
in most cases will be the board of directors. However, for special
meetings, notice is required; 0 5 but here also the specifics are left to
the by-law provision.
In a fairly austere sentence that is somewhat ambiguous in its
effect, KFLSA § 271A.215(2) further provides that "attendance of a
director at a meeting shall constitute a waiver of notice of such
meeting, except where a director attends a meeting for the express
purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business because the
meeting is not lawfully called or convened." This provision should
apply to either a regular meeting at which notice is required by a
by-law or to a special meeting since notice is statutorily required.
Therefore, notice may be waived by attendance at the meeting, as
well as by a written waiver under the general section on waiver
of notice.'06
In the limited situation where a director attends only for the
purpose of objecting to the transaction of business because the meet-
ing was not lawfully called or convened, the director preserves his
position of not having received notice. This should have the effect
of making at least the special meeting an illegally convened meet-
ing; 0 7 although the statute is silent on the effect of such events.
One important matter apparently left to the interpretation of the
courts is whether a director's presence under these circumstances
1o4This section eliminates the validity of the early common law distinction
between "corporate acts" and "business acts," where courts held that the former
could be done only at a meeting held within the state while the latter could be
done outside the state. MoDE Bus. Corn'. Acr ANN. 2D § 43 ff 2 (1971).
105 Id.
206 See generally KRSA § 271A.660.
107 In general, the courts tend to be broad-minded in reviewing actual
omissions in the absence of specific harm. MoDEL Bus. Corn. Act ANN. 2D § 43
Uf 2 (1971).
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can be counted for the purposes of establishing a quorum. 0 8 The
logical result would be that if a director attends and immediately
announces his objection to the convening of the meeting, his presence
could not be used in establishing a quorum. However, if he either
stays and participates in the meeting or subsequently changes his
mind and revokes his prior objection, his presence may be used to
establish the quorum.
The act further provides that neither the business to be transacted,
nor the purpose of any regular or special meeting need be specified
in either the notice or waiver unless the by-laws so require. This
provision is at least somewhat incongruous with the provision per-
mitting a director to attend only for the purpose of objecting. One
may wonder how a director could attend only for the purpose of
objecting if he has no idea what is to come before the meeting and
nothing in the notice, if any, informs him of the agenda.10 The
answer must lie in the fact that, as a matter of general practice, the
purposes for which most special meetings are called are usually
communicated informally to the directors. To be added to this
reasoning is the strong policy argument that the board should not
be limited to matters specified in the notice, but should be free to
act on any matter that is properly within the scope of board action.
D. Waiver of Notie-KRSA § 271A.660
The new act contains a general waiver of notice provision ap-
plicable to both shareholders and directors whenever notice is re-
quired under any provision of the act, the articles, or the by-laws."10
This section provides that a waiver "in writing signed by the person
or persons entitled to such notice, whether before or after the time
stated therein, shall be equivalent to the giving of such notice."
Previously, the corporate statute contained a substantially similar
provision, but it was applicable only to shareholders,"' while the
new section extends the waiver privilege to directors as well.1 2 In
addition, the scope of the privilege is now applied to notice provisions
108 See generally LEGisLrAE HEAaIqG, supra note 6, at 74-78.
109 Id.
110 KRSA § 271A.660. This section is identical to ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus.
Cornp. ACT § 144 (rev. ed. 1969).
"'KRS § 271.295(4).
112 At common law the prevailing view was that only shareholders could
waive notice, either before or after the event. This distinction resulted from the
significance attached to the "consultative function" of directors. Such a distinction
is now thought to be outmoded due to the prominence of statutes allowing for
board action without a meeting, as well as to the effectiveness of modem com-
munication. MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. 2D § 144 11 2 (1971).
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in the articles, the by-laws, and any section of the act itself. This
general section is complemented by the more specific section pro-
viding that attendance of a director at a board meeting shall con-
stitute waiver of notice, except when he attends only for the purpose
of objecting to the transaction of business. 113
E. Action by Directors Without a Meeting-KRSA § 271A.220
Action by the board of directors may be taken informally, with-
out a meeting, under the new act.114 Informal action by the board
was also permitted under the previous statute;" 5 however, there are
important procedural and substantive differences in the new law.
The new section basically provides that, subject to contrary pro-
visions in the articles or by-laws, any action to be taken at a board
or committee meeting "may be taken without a meeting if a consent
in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by all
of the directors, or all of the members of the committee, as the case
may be. Such consent shall have the same effect as a unanimous
vote." This provision, like the previous one, substantially dilutes the
traditional "board action" rule which required that the board meet
and act only as a body.116
Flexibility in the performance of the board's management function
is the principal purpose of this section. Statutory approval for the
often necessary and common practice of informal action in the close
corporation is another purpose for the provision.117 Minority interests
are protected by the requirement that the consent must be unanimous,
although opportunity for abuse may still exist, especially in dealings
with third parties.
The underlying principle behind this section is ratification. The
board, acting through all of its members, may now subsequently
ratify prior informal action." 8 This differs from the previous statute
where consent had to be given before the action was taken. The new
section does not specifically mention a prior grant of consent for
subsequent action, a practice which is not based on the ratification
principle. However, this type of action should be interpreted to be
113 KRSA § 271A.215(2).
114 KRSA § 271A.220. This section is identical to ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT § 44 (rev. ed. 1969).
115 KRS § 271.845(4) (e).
116 For cases generally following the board action rule see Caddy Oil Co. v.
Sommer, 218 S.W. 288 (Ky. 1920); Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky.
1917); Paducah & Il. Ferry Co. v. Robertson, 171 S.W. 171 (Ky. 1914);
American Wire-Nail Co. v. Gedge, 29 S.W. 353 (Ky. 1895).
117 MODEL Bus. CoaP. Acr Ar . 2D § 44 9 2 (1971).
118 LErisr. rn= HEAI G, supra note 6, at 157.
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within the scope of the provision, especially since it was authorized
by the prior statute and is, thus, not alien to Kentucky law.
III. Dnmcros' MANAGEMENT FUNCrxoN
A. Executive and Other Committees-KRSA § 271A.210
Kentucky has long recognized the power of the board of directors
to delegate part of its management functions to an executive com-
mittee." 9 This right was codified in the previous statute
120 that
permitted a majority of the whole board, by resolution, to designate
two or more of the directors to constitute an executive committee,
which to the extent provided in the resolution, could exercise the
authority of the board in the management of the corporation.
The new act' 21 also recognizes this right although there are
important substantive differences between the two provisions. The
new section states in part that if the articles or by-laws so provide,
the directors, by resolution adopted by a majority of the full board,
may designate from among its members an executive committee and
one or more other committees each of which, to the extent provided
in the resolution or articles or by-laws, shall have and may exercise
all the authority of the board. This section is dependent upon an
enabling provision in the articles or by-laws, and designates no
minimum number of committee members. These features are changes
from the previous statute.
However, the most significant change from prior law is in the
scope of the authority that may be delegated. The new section
expressly provides that all the authority of the board may be dele-
gated, but only to the extent provided in a resolution, the articles,
or the by-laws. The extent of the powers so delegated is limited only
by a specific enumeration of actions the committee may not take,
22
"9 See Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917), upholding the
power of the board of directors to delegate part of their authority to an executive
committee.
120KRS § 271.345(4)(d).
121 KRSA § 271A.210. This provision is in large part patterned after ABA-
ALI MODEL Bus. Corn. ACr § 42 (rev. ed. 1969).
122 KRSA § 271A.210 provides:
. but no such committee shall have the authority of the board of
directors in reference to amending the articles of incorporation, adopting
a plan of merger or consolidation, recommending to the shareholders the
sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the
property and assets of the corporation otherwise than the usual and
regular course of its business, recommending to the shareholders a
voluntary dissolution of the corporation or a revocation thereof, or
amending the by-laws of the corporation.
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all of which are of a fundamental or structural nature and remain
vested in the full board. The previous statute allowed the committee
to exercise board authority in the management of the corporation,
a phrase which is cognizant of the traditional distinction between
ministerial functions and discretionary functions, the former being
delegable and the latter non-delegable. 123 This distinction is not
made in the new statute, as all powers may be delegated subject to
those powers specifically made non-delegable. 1 24
This new section will be of special benefit to the large corporation
where overly centralized management may be an obstacle to prompt
decision-making in corporate affairs. More significantly, it may also
provide a loophole, enabling the majority interest on the board to
designate members of its faction to constitute committees that can
effectively control substantially all of the management functions.
Further, since committee action is subject, in most cases, to the same
rules that govern action by the board,125 a majority of the committee,
if a quorum is present, may act with little interference from minority
board or committee members.
The section is also significant in what it does not say. Deleted
from the House-passed version of the bill was a sentence providing
that the designation of a committee shall not operate to relieve the
board of directors, or any member thereof, of any responsibility
imposed by law.126 The underlying question is, of course, whether
board members who are not committee members and did not par-
ticipate in actions of the committee, may nevertheless be held liable
for negligent or fraudulent actions of the committee. Several par-
ticipants in the public hearings on the proposed act felt that such a
provision would be unjust to innocent board members and would, as
a practical matter, require the board to consider and ratify every
action of the committee.1 27 In any event, the conscious deletion of
this part of the Model Act section could be interpreted as establish-
ing a legislative intent to excuse nonparticipating board members
from liability for committee actions.'
2 8
' 23 See LEGIsLATrVE HEAR Ir, supra note 6, at 71-74. For a collection of
cases distinguishing between ministerial and discretionary powers, see MODEL Bus.
Coap. Aar ANN. 2n § 42 Uf 4.02 (1971).124 See MODEL Bus. Corn,. Acr ANN 2D § 42 (1971).125 See Canada-Atlantic & Plant S.S. Co. v. Flanders, 145 F. 875 (1st Cir.
1906); McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 28 N.E. 245 (Mass. 1891); and
further cases cited in MODEL Bus. Corn'. Act ANN. 2D § 42 U 4.06 (1971).126 See Ky. AcTs ch. 274 § 42 (1972).
' 2 7 See LEGISLATIWE HEARG, supra note 6, at 73-74 (1971) (comments of
Messrs. Shaikun, Ward, Caldwell and Greenebaum).
128Note the liability under ite federal laws may be a different matter indeed.
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B. Dividends and Distributions from Capital Surplus-
KRSA §§ 271A.225, 271A.280
The new act, like the previous one,' 29 vests the board of directors
with discretion to declare dividends' 30 and make distributions from
capital surplus,131 subject to certain limitations. Within broad limits,
the board of directors has discretion in determining whether dividends
or other distributions will be made, and if so, in setting the amount
of such distributions. It is usually difficult for a shareholder to prevail
in his claim that the board has improperly exercised its discretion
not to declare dividends or has declared dividends which are too
small.132 Existing case law on proper exercise of this discretion, 133
abuse of discretion, 134 and limitations on discretion'31 may be useful
in dealing with these questions under the new law.
For a detailed treatment of when dividends and distributions may
legally be declared and the maximum limits on the amount of these
distributions, consult the section of this symposium concerning cor-
porate finance. Director liability for improper payment of dividends
or other distributions is treated in KRS § 271A.240.
IV. FmucAnRY DUTEs OF DmECroRTE
Introductory Note
Standards of conduct to which directors are held accountable are
encompassed in a variety of doctrines and theories, but can usually
129 KRS § 271.265.
130 KRSA § 271A.225. This section is identical to ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 45 (rev. ed. 1969). Note, however, that in subsection (a) the
alternative provision provided by the Model Act has been adopted in place of the
regular provision.
131 KRSA § 271A.230. This section is identical to ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 46 (rev. ed. 1969).
13 2 See MODEL Bus. Corp. Acr ANN. 2D § 45 ff 2 (1971).
13 3 See Gearhart v. Lee-Clay Products Co., 152 S.W.2d 1003 (Ky. 1941),
stating that in a stockholder's petition to compel declaration of a stock dividend
the existence of surplus out of which a dividend can be paid must be alleged;
Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, 195 S.W. 477 (Ky. 1917), stating that unless
the directors are guilty of bad faith or a willful abuse of discretion the courts
will not interfere; Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 179 S.W. 205 (Ky. 1915),
stating that dividends are payable as the directors in the exercise of their
discretion may declare. For a further collection of cases, see 3 P-H CORP. (Ky.)
ff 45 (1972).
13 4 See Louisville & St. L. By. Co. v. U.S., 20 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Ky. 1937),
holding that a corporation has no right to exclude some stockholders of the same
class from receiving dividends; Patton v. Nicholas, 302 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); and further
collection of cases in MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 45(a) f1 4.06(2) (1971).
135See Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 53 N.E.2d 230 (Mass. 1944);
Cannon v. Wiscasset Mills Co., 141 S.E. 344 (N.C. 1928); and other cases in
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 45(a) ff 4.06(3) (1971).
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be classified into three broad areas: (1) duty of care, (2) duty of
loyalty, and (3) conduct under federal statutes, especially the secu-
rifles laws. Contrary to the previous act,' 36 the present act does not
specifically deal with the duty of care, as this area is presumably
left to the courts.137 Of course, director conduct under federal statutes
is a matter independent of, and not affected by, the Kentucky cor-
poration law. 38 However, the present act does treat some situations
in the duty-of-loyalty area which are discussed below.
A. Director Conflicts of Interest-KRSA § 271A.205
Statutory regulation of director conflicts of interest is new to
Kentucky law, although it appears to have been a common practice
to include regulatory standards in the articles of incorporation
through KRS § 271.035(2) of the prior act.' 39 However, the standards
regarding most director conflicts are now prescribed by statute 40
with no specific allowance made for provisions in the articles.
KRSA § 271A.205(1) essentially provides that no transaction
between a corporation and a director or any other entity in which
one or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially
interested, shall be void or voidable solely because of such relation-
ship or interest, or because such director or directors are present at
the meeting of the board or a committee thereof which authorizes,
approves or ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or
their votes are counted for such purpose, if one of three conditions
is met: (a) the contract or transaction is not manifestly unfair to
130 KRS § 271.365 provided:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to
the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their respective
positions in good faith, and with that diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in
like positions.
137 While the standard for the duty of care is no longer prescribed by
statute, there is little reason to conclude that this standard or a similar one, as
well as the related "business judgment rule," will not continue to be imposed by
judicial decision. See Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkle, 224 S.W.2d 923 (Ky.
1949)- Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (1939), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1952); People's State Bank v. Jacksonian Hotel Co., 87
S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1935); Reinhardt v. Owensboro Planing Mill Co., 215 S.W.
523 (Ky. 1919); Graham v. McAdoo, 123 S.W. 260 (Ky. 1909) (applying
business judgment rule).
' 38 See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2a Cir. 1968). See
generally Ruder, Wheat, & Loss, Standards of Conduct under the Federal
Securities Acts, 27 Bus. LAw 75 (Feb. 1972); McLaren & Bicks, Standards of
Conduct under the Antitrust Acts, 27 Bus. LAw. 95 (Feb. 1972).
139 See LEcisr.KArv HEarNc, supra note 6, at 69 (comment of Mr. Shaikun).
140 KRSA § 271A.205. This provision, for the most part, is identical to
ABA-AL MorEL Bus. CoR'. AcT § 41 (rev. ed. 1969).
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the corporation and the relationship or interest is disclosed to the
board or committee approving the transaction without counting the
vote of the interested director, or (b) the contract or transaction is
not manifestly unfair to the corporation and the relationship is dis-
closed to the shareholders and they approve the transaction, or (c)
the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
Thus, if any one of these three conditions is met, the contract or
transaction may stand.141 The first two conditions combine fairness
with disclosure, while the last focuses only on fairness and reason-
ableness, no disclosure being necessary. It is obvious that any of the
three, especially the latter, presents considerable liberality for treating
such contracts or transactions. The only variation in this section from
the Model Act section is that in (a) and (b) the phrase, "The con-
tract or transaction is not manifestly unfair to the corporation" has
been added to the Kentucky provision. Consequently, the Model Act
treatment of director conflicts of interest has been tightened in Ken-
tucky by adding a standard of fairness to what was mere disclosure.
Despite this change, the provision remains as one of the least re-
strictive in any jurisdiction.
Procedural obstacles are removed in KRSA § 271A.205(2) which
allows interested directors to be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a board or committee meeting that approves or
ratifies the transaction. Coupled with the provisions of KRSA §
271A.205(1) that permit interested directors to be present at the
meeting and even vote for the approval of the transaction, only one
procedural requirement remains. In option (a) of the three con-
ditions, the vote of the board or committee approving the transaction
must be sufficient to pass without counting the vote of the interested
director. There is no prohibition against the interested director
voting his shares on this matter at a shareholders' meeting, and, of
course, under option (c) neither disclosure nor the approval of any
corporate body is necessary if the contract is fair and reasonable.
Some concern surfaced at the public hearings that a literal reading
of the act would require disclosure of either relationship or interest,
but not necessarily both. The following situation was suggested:
42
if a director of a corporation is financially interested in one of the
141The function of this section is not to provide a basis for validating for
all purposes a contract or transaction between an interested director and his
coraton, but simply to establish that such a transaction is not automatically
void or voidable solely by reason of the director's interest. In addition, the courts
retain their full powers to deal with such matters under general equitable
principles. MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT ANN. 2D § 41 f1 2 (1971).1 4 2 LEGISLATwE HEABING, supra note 6, at 70 (comments of Mr. Caldwell).
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corporation's major suppliers and the fact of his relationship to the
supplier is disclosed, but the fact that this other corporation is a
major supplier is not disclosed, then there would be a disclosure of
relationship but not interest. Taken literally, this would satisfy the
disclosure requirement of the new act. One participant in the hear-
ing expressed the view that the act requires "full disclosure" which
includes both relationship and interest, but at least in large cor-
porations, the whole matter is largely pre-empted by the federal
proxy rules which require disclosure of all possible areas of conflict
of interest. 43 In the small corporation, however, the question ap-
parently remains open.
The application of this section is limited to conflicts of interest
in transactions directly between the director and the corporation
itself, or between the corporation and another corporation where
there is a common director, or between the corporation and another
entity in which the director has a financial interest.144 Other sections
of the new act cover corporate loans to employees and directors,
145
the right of the board of directors to fix the compensation of its
members, 14 liability of directors for declaring illegal dividends or
making illegal distributions, and illegal purchases of treasury stock.
147
Not specifically covered by the new act, but usually falling within
the concept of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, are situations of usurping
a corporate opportunity148 and acquiring a competing business. The
law on these situations is left to development through the case-by-case
method of judicial decision.
B. Loans to Employees and Directors-KRSA § 271A.285
Statutory regulation of loans to directors, officers, and employees
is also new to Kentucky law. The above section, which attempts
143 Id. at 71 (comment of Mr. Greenebaum). The federal proxy rules are
applicable to any corporation whose shares are listed on a national securities
exchange and also to corporations whose shares are traded over the counter if the
latter corporations have more than 500 shareholders and $1,000,000 in assets.
The proxy rules may be found in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (Supp. 1972).
144See MoDEL Bus. Conp. Acr ANN. 2D § 41 II 2 (1971).
145 KRSA § 271A.285.
146 KRSA § 271A.175.
147 KRSA § 271A.240.
148 For cases involving the corporate opportunity and other loyalty doctrines,
see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinke,
224 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 1949), stating that a director or officer breaches no fiduciary
duty to the corporation in taking advantage of a business opportunity which the
corporation is financially and legally unable to engage in, and the director is
not compelled to account to the corporation for any profits realized; Reutlinger
v. Reiss, 183 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1944); Coleman v. Hanger, 275 S.W. 784 (Ky.
1925); Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 153 S.W. 50 (Ky. 1918).
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to set safe but flexible standards for regulating such conduct, is
identical to the Model Act section,149 except for a sentence exempting
certain types of businesses from part of the section.
The statute basically provides: "A corporation shall not lend
money to or use its credit to assist its directors without authorization
in the particular case by its shareholders. . . ." Inserted into the
Model Act section by the legislature was the exempting provision
that the above sentence does not apply to transactions in the ordinary
and usual course of business of any bank, trust company, combined
bank and trust company, insurance company, savings and loan as-
sociation, credit union or industrial loan corporation. The section
then qualifies the initial sentence:
A corporation may lend money to and use its credit to assist any
employe of the corporation or of a subsidiary, including any such
employe who is a director of the corporation, if the board of di-
rectors decides that such loan or assistance may benefit the cor-
poration.
Consequently, loans may be made (1) to any employee if the
board decides that such assistance may benefit the corporation; (2)
to any employee who is also a director, under the same condition as
employee loans; and (3) to any director who is not an employee,
only where there is shareholder approval. The proximate result of
this section is that inside directors, due to their dual capacity as
director and employee, may receive assistance from the corporation
while outside directors may not. Such a result is not entirely logical
since the inside directors are the ones who are in positions allowing
the greatest opportunity for self-dealing.50 In contrast, the outside
directors are not usually in such a position, but nevertheless, must
still obtain shareholder approval. The provision has been criticized
for thus discriminating against outside directors, especially since
the SEC proxy rules permit loans of up to $30,000 to directors without
requiring public disclosure.' 5' The reasoning here is that if even the
usually restrictive proxy rules would not interfere with such loans, at
least those less than $30,000, then a supposedly liberal state corpora-
tion statute should likewise not interfere. Of course, this reasoning
would not be applicable for the smaller corporation where $30,000
may constitute the entire capital of the corporation.
149 Compare KRSA § 271A.235 with ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. ConP. AcT § 47
(rev. ed. 1969).
150One possible method to circumvent this restriction would be to employ
the director in some minor consultant position and proceed with the loan. LEcis-
LAfrlvE HEA~N, supra note 6, at 115 (comments of Mr. Shaikun).
15i Id.
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Regarding loans to both employees and director-employees, the
sole criterion for the propriety of such assistance is a determination
by the board of directors that the loan may benefit the corporation.
No standards or guidelines for such a determination are prescribed
by the act, although presumably a business purpose is required.
152
Likewise, the board has complete discretion, subject to the benefit
test, to determine what security, if any, will be required for the loan.
It may be advantageous to the corporation in a particular case to
make a loan without security. However, this should occur infrequently
since the board is responsible for making improvident loans and may
be held liable for waste of corporate assets.
53
Absent also from the section is any mention of what rate of
interest, if any, the loan should carry. The lack of statutory guidance
here may logically be interpreted as leaving this matter also to the
discretion of the board. However, one test of the adequacy of the
interest rate would be to balance the expected benefit to the corpora-
tion to be derived from granting the loan against a reasonable return
achievable by the corporation had the funds been invested else-
where. 54 A similar standard could be used to test the adequacy of
the security for the loan by balancing the expected benefit and likeli-
hood of timely repayment against reasonable investment returns
available elsewhere to the corporation.
C. Liability of Directors in Certain Cases-KRSA § 271A.240
This section' 55 is similar to the prior statute' 56 in imposing liability
upon directors for declaring improper dividends or making other
unlawful distributions, for allowing improper purchases by a cor-
poration of its own stock, and for agreeing to improper distributions
152 The comment to the Model Act section states:
Use of corporate funds for other than corporate purposes is improper.
Even the sole stockholder is not entitled to use corporate funds for his
individual purposes. Unless creditors' rights are involved, there may be
no one to complain about such acts but nevertheless there may be tax
consequences. For instance, the funds used might, for tax purposes, be
considered a dividend to the stockholder.
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 47 11 2, Comment (1971).
153 Id.
'54 Cf. Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 412 P.2d 47 (Ariz. 1966)
(en banc), upholding loans made by a corporation to its dominant directors
without the required majority vote of the board of directors, for less than the
legal interest rate, where there was no fraud or unfairness and no showing that
funds could have been invested at a more substantial interest yield, and the
loans were repaid in full with interest. See further collection of cases in MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 47 1 4 (1971).155 This provision is patterned substantially after ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
Acr § 48 (rev. ed. 1969), with several important changes.
156 ICES § 271.275.
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of corporate assets during liquidation. It also deals with the time
when a director is deemed to have assented to such action, good
faith defenses, and the right of contribution from shareholders and
other directors.
KRSA § 271A.240(1) begins with the phrase "In addition to any
other liabilities imposed by law upon directors of a corporation," and
then proceeds to state the three liability provisions mentioned above.
The significance of this initial phrase deserves some comment. Such
"other liabilities" are, in general, correlative of the broad powers
placed upon directors by this act to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation.157 However, liability resulting from common law
or judicial doctrines not specifically covered by the act, as well as
liability under federal statutes, may also be included. This determina-
tion may be particularly relevant in clarifying a director's right to
contribution from other directors under KRSA § 271A.240(5).
KRSA § 271A.240(1)(a) provides that directors who vote for or
assent to the declaration of any dividend or other distribution of
assets to the shareholders, contrary to the provisions of the actl5w or
any restriction contained in the articles of incorporation, shall be
jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of such
dividend or distribution paid or distributed in excess of the amount
which could have been paid or distributed without a violation of
the act or the restrictions in the articles. Note that the liability is
joint and several and runs to the corporation. The amount of liability
is only for the illegal part of the dividend or distribution, not the full
amount.
K.RSA § 271A.240(1)(b) provides generally that directors who vote
for or assent to the purchase of the corporation's own shares contrary
to the provisions of the act'19 shall be jointly and severally liable to
the corporation for the amount of consideration paid which is in
excess of the maximum amount which could lawfully have been paid.
157 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2n § 48 IU 2 (1971).
158 For what constitutes a proper dividend or distribution under this act, see
KRSA § 271A.225 concerning dividends and KRSA § 271A.280 concerning
distributions from capital surplus.
159 As to when a corporation may properly purchase its own shares, see
KRSA § 271A.030. See also Reilly v. Segert, 201 N.E.2d 444 (M11. 1964), where
judgment had been entered against the directors for a distribution by purchase
of shares where the corporation was insolvent when the payment was made. The
court held liable the shareholders who had received the corporate funds for
their shares, further holding that a statutory provision for director liability did not
negate the common law liability of shareholders. Note the additional cases
digested in MODEL Bus. Corn'. Acr ANN. 2D § 48 f1 4 (1971). See generally
Ruder, Dangers in a Corporation's Purchases of Its Own Shares, 13 PAc. Lw.
75, 76 (May 1967).
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KRSA § 271A.240(1)(c) provides that directors who vote for or
assent to any distribution of assets to the shareholders during liquida-
tion of the corporation, without payment and discharge of or adequate
provision for all known debts and liabilities of the corporation, shall
be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the value of the
assets distributed to the extent that such debts are not thereafter
paid and discharged.
KRSA § 271A.240(2) states that any director present at a board
meeting at which action described in KRSA § 271A.240(1) 16 0 is taken,
shall be presumed to have "assented to"'0 ' the action unless he does
one of three things: (1) enters his dissent in the minutes of the
meeting, or (2) files his written dissent with the secretary of the
meeting before adjournment, or (3) forwards his dissent to the secre-
tary of the corporation by registered mail within 60 days after ad-
journment but not later than three days after he has learned of such
action.1 2 The right to dissent does not apply to a director who voted
in favor of the action. It has been suggested that to escape the
burdens of this provision, the board should meet as a committee of
the whole since the provision is applicable only to meetings of the
board of directors. 3  Whether the courts would agree with such a
literal reading of the provision remains for determination.
KRSA § 271A.240(3) deals with a good faith defense. 0 4 A director
will not be held liable under KRSA § 271A.240(1)(a), (b), or (c) if he
relied and acted in good faith upon financial statements of the cor-
poration represented to him to be correct by the president or officer
in charge of the books of account, or stated in a written report by an
independent public or certified public accountant fairly to reflect
the financial condition of the corporation. The director may also
160 The Model Act makes this subsection applicable to "any corporate matter,"
rather than only to those actions described in KRSA § 271A.240(1).
161 See Aiken v. Insull, 122 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S.
806 (1942), decided under a statute which provided that directors "declaring or
assenting to" illegal dividends were liable, where it was held that the word
"assentin "includes the approval and ratification of a dividend after it has been
declared by the executive committee. In this case the directors adopted a resolu-
tion approving the executive committees declaration of an unlawful dividend.
See also Cunningham v. Shellman, 175 S.W. 1045 (Ky. 1915). Note the further
collection of cases in MoDEL Bus. Co"e. Aor ANN. 2D § 48 f9 4.02 (1971).
102 Here again the legislature has broadened the Model Act to make the
section more flexible to the director. The 60-day provision was added by the
legislature.
63 See LGisrAIW HmEN, supra note 6, at 79-80 (comments of Mr.
Shaikun).
164 For cases applying the common law defense of good faith with regard to
improper dividends, see Cunningham v. Shellman, 175 S.W. 1045 (Ky. 1915);
City of Franklin v. Caldwell, 96 S.W. 605 (Ky. 1906); Lexington & Ohio R.R. v.
Bridges, 46 Ky. 556 (1847).
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escape liability in determining the amount available for a dividend
or distribution if in good faith he considered the assets to be of their
book value. Unlike the prior statute, reliance upon the representa-
tions of an "employee" having charge of the books of account is not
included in the good faith defense.16 5 Regarding the independent
accountant, reliance is allowed only on those statements where the
opinion is given that the statements fairly reflect the financial con-
dition of the corporation. Thus, on its face, good faith reliance is
not a defense where the independent accountant does not express
the opinion that the statements fairly reflect the financial condition
of the corporation.
KRSA § 271A.240(4) gives any director held liable under this
section the right of contribution from shareholders who accepted or
received the dividend or distribution, knowing it to have been made
in violation of the act, in proportion to the amounts received by
them.'66 This differs from the previous statute where shareholders
were liable only if no director were liable, or the directors liable were
unable to pay the judgment.16 7 To this extent, the new section repre-
sents a broadening of shareholder liability.
The director's right to contribution from other directors is set
forth in KRSA § 271A.240(5). A director is entitled to contribution
from the other directors who voted for or assented to the action upon
which the claim is asserted.
Unlike the previous statute, 68 the new provision contains no in-
ternal statute of limitations on either director or shareholder liability.
Formerly, there was a two-year statute of limitations on these types
of actions, and despite a proposal to insert such a provision into the
new section, 69 the act as approved contains no such provision. The
165 The absence of the word "employee" in this section prompted some
discussion at the public hearings on the bill. The view was expressed that
permitting reliance upon employee representations could open the door to certain
fraudulent practices, due to the less than independent nature of the director-
employee relationship. See LEGISLATivE HEAING, supra note 6, at 82 (comment
of Chairman Lewis).
166 See Grant v. Ross, 87 S.W. 268 (Ky. 1896), stating that the corporation
can recover dividends illegally declared under a mistake or misapprehension as
to the right to declare them; of. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Glenn, 86 F.
Sup. 552 (W.D. Ky. 1941) stating that dividends accrue to the stockholder
on the date they are declared although payable at a later date to stockholders
of record on an intermediate date; Lobaco Co. v. Chaffn, 285 S.W. 993 (Ky.
1921). Note further collection of cases in 3 P-H Corn'. (Ky.) f11 45, 48 (1972).
167 KRS § 271.275(2). However, under the previous statute, shareholders
could be liable even if they did not know that the dividend or distribution was
illegal. Thus, innocent shareholders have a defense under the new law that was
not previously available.
16 8KRS § 271.275(3).
169 See LEGiSLATVE HEAI G, supra note 6, at 81-82 (1971) (proposal of
Mr. Shaikun).
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opinion was expressed that this section may be subject to the general
five-year statute applicable when there is no other statute specified. 70
D. Penalties Imposed Upon Officers and Directors-KRSA § 271A.640
The previous statute' 7 ' regarding penalties imposed upon officers
and directors has been retained almost in its entirety by the new
act with a corresponding rejection of the Model Act section. KRSA
§ 271A.640(1) provides that any foreign corporation transacting
business in this state without complying with the provisions of this
chapter that require certain things to be done before transacting
business, and any officer, director, or agent of the corporation who
knowingly participates in such activity, shall be fined from $100 to
$1,000 for each offense. KRSA § 271A.640(2) provides an identical
fine for any corporation 172 that violates any provision of this chapter,
as well as for any officer, director, or agent who knowingly participates
therein. For violations of this section, the commonwealth's attorney
of the county where the corporation is domiciled-and not the attorney
general-has the responsibility of instituting the suit.' 73
V. OFCERS
A. Number and Authority of Officers-KRSA § 271A.250
The present enactment174 concerning officers contains only minor
deviations from the previous statute.175 "The officers of a corporation
shall consist of a president, a secretary, and a treasurer, each of whom
shall be elected by the board of directors" in the manner prescribed
by the by-laws. Contrary to both the Model Act and the prior statute,
no mention is made of the vice-president. Therefore, this position is
not statutorily required, but may be created and filled in accordance
with the sentence of subsection (1) allowing election or appointment
of "such officers and assistant officers and agents as may be deemed
necessary." These other officers, of course, are discretionary with the
board of directors and are governed by the regulatory provisions of
the by-laws.
The act expressly allows one person to hold any two or more
170 Id.
'71 KRS § 271.990.
172 See Kentucky Straight Creek Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d
470 (Ky. 1947).
'73 See Commonwealth ex rel. Breckinridge v. Monroe Co., 378 S.W.2d 809
(Ky. 1964).
174KRSA § 271A.250(1). This provision is substantially similar to ABA-ALI
MoDEL Bus. Corn'. ACT § 50 (rev. ed. 1969).
175 KRS § 271.855(1).
1972]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
offices except that the same person cannot hold both the offices of
president and secretary if the corporation has more than one share-
holder. Thus, all corporations are required to have a president,
secretary, and treasurer, but only two persons are required to hold
these three offices if the corporation has more than one shareholder.
If the corporation has only one shareholder, the act implies that all
three offices may be held by one person. In this regard, the provision
is specially tailored to meet the needs of the close corporation and
is more liberal than either the prior law or the Model Act.
KRSA § 271A.250(2) outlines in the broadest terms the duties and
authority of officers and agents of the corporation. It is identical to
the Model Act and substantially similar to the previous provision.176
The new provision states that all officers and agents shall have such
authority and perform such duties in the management of the corpora-
tion as may be provided in the by-laws or by resolution of the board
not inconsistent with the by-laws. It is important to note that this
authority is express authority, derived from the statute, the by-laws,
and resolutions of the board. 77 The provision does not encompass
the more troublesome apparent authority, authority flowing from
ratification, or implied authority.
Implied authority may be called "inherent" or "presumptive"
authority or authority "by virtue of office" and often results from
general custom or past practices or as incidental to express authority.
Implied authority is found in the general manager of the corporation
who has authority to make any contract or perform any act in the
ordinary course of business. When the president acts as general
manager, he enjoys these implied powers.178 However, other officers
are rarely considered to possess implied authority.
Problems concerning apparent authority and principles of estoppel
usually arise in third-party situations. When a corporation cloaks an
officer or agent with apparent authority, and a third party in good
faith reasonably relies on such authority, the corporation is estopped
from denying the authority.179 The board of directors can subse-
quently ratify prior unauthorized acts of officers, if these acts could
have been previously authorized by the board. Ratification creates
an equivalent to prior authority and may be express or implied. Ac-
ceptance of the benefits of unauthorized acts of officers, with knowl-
edge of the facts, will constitute an implied ratification. 80
176 KRS § 271.355(2).177 MoDEL Bus. Corn. AC ANN. 2D § 50 U 2 (1971).
178 Id. 179 Id. 180 Id.
[Vol. 61
NoT: DmxcroRs AN O mcxs
Kentucky courts have recognized generally the distinctions
between authority that may be express, implied, apparent, or result-
ing from ratification. As the new section deals only with express
authority, existing case law on the other sources of authority may be
particularly relevant in determining the full scope of the powers and
duties of corporate officers. Litigation has arisen in the past regarding
the following: the express authority of the president;' 8 ' the implied
authority of the president, 8 2 vice-president,' 83 secretary,184 agent, 85
stockholder, 86 and bookkeeper; 187 the apparent authority of all officers
181 See Davis v. Pendennis Club, 19 S.W.2d 1078 (Ky. 1929) (holding that
if the president is authorized to make a contract and does so, it is binding on the
corporation); Liebowitz v. Allied Brewing & Distilling Co., 134 S.W.2d 994 (Ky.
1939) (contract binding on third party). See generally 3 P-H CoRe. (Ky.) § 50
(1972) for digest of cases found in this and the ten succeeding footnotes.
' 8 2 See Southeastern Land Co. v. Jonnard, 249 S.W. 789 (Ky. 1923), holding
that the president of a real estate corporation may authorize an agent to sell
some corporate property as part of the regular business of the corporation- In re
Fed. Coal Co., 31 F.2d 375 (E.D. Ky. 1927) holding that the president as
general manager has the power to secure an indebtedness of the corporation by
pledging the bonds of the company; Brarnblet v. Commonwealth Land & Lumber
Co., 83 S.W. 599 (Ky. 1904), holding that the president may not purchase debts
of the corporation at a discount and enforce them against it for full value; Harbel
Coal Co. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 414 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1967), holding that
the president has no general authority to execute contracts concerning lease of
coal lands.
183 See Clay v. Mt. Holly Dev. Co., 464 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1971), where the
vice-president bad no authority to issue checks to himself for alleged services
rendered, when there was no board resolution granting this authority; however,
he is entitled to reasonable compensation for work performed beyond the scope
of his duties; Union Motor Co. v. Taylor, 267 S.W. 170 (Ky. 1924), which held
that when a corporation has permitted its vice-president to make the corporation's
employment contracts it is bound thereby; Empire Coal Mining Co. v. Empire
Coal Co., 210 S.W. 474 (Ky. 1919), holding that it is not within the ordinary and
apparent authority of the vice-president and general manager to sell all the
corporation's assets. See also Kentucky-Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Corp. v. Clark,
57 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1933); Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 150 S.W. 817 (Ky.
1912).
' 8 4 See Citizens' Dev. Co. v. Kypawva Oil Co., 229 S.W. 88 (Ky. 1921),
which held that the secretary is generally a mere ministerial officer who keeps
books and records, and in the absence of express authority has no power to buy
property for the corporation; Main St. Warehouse Co. v. Bain Moore Tobacco
Co., 250 S.W. 98 (Ky. 1923).
18 5 See Am. Oil Pump & Tank Co. v. Sizemore, 276 S.W. 558 (Ky. 1925),
where the court held that in order for the act of an agent to bind the company,
it must appear that he was acting within the actual or apparent scope of his
authority; see also Commonwealth v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 93 S.W.2d 840 (Ky.
1936); Harlan Fuel Co. v. Wiggington, 262 S.W. 957 (Ky. 1924).
186 See Paducah & Ill. Ferry Co. v. Robertson, 171 S.W. 171 (Ky. 1914),
which held that where the chairman of the board acquiesces in the employment of
an agent by a stockholder, the corporation is bound by the contract of employment.
187 See Main St. Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Bain Moore Tobacco Co., 250
S.W. 98 (Ky. 1923) holding that a bookkeeper is a mere clerical employee of the
corporation, and witout special authority given to him, may not bind the corpora-
tion by his promise or agreement.
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and agents; 188 and the ratification of unauthorized acts8 9 including
the related principles of estoppel'90 and laches.191
B. Removal of Officers-KRSA § 271A.255
The new section' 92 concerning removal of officers represents no
significant changes from prior law. 193 The present statute allows the
removal of any officer or agent by the board of directors, whenever
in its judgment the best interests of the corporation will be served
thereby. It further provides that such removal shall be without
prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed,
but the election or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of
itself create contract rights.
Removal of officers is entirely discretionary with the board of
directors, and therefore, may be with or without cause.194 Usually the
courts will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion.195 How-
ever, an officer employed under a contract of employment will have
an action for damages if he is removed without cause before his term
188 See Preece v. Burns' Adm'r, 81 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1935), holding that
a corporation is bound by the acts of its officers and agents who have been held
out as having the authority which they exercise, or by its custom of dealing;
Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 218 S.W. 288 (Ky. 1920), holding that apparent
authority of an officer is based upon his past acts on the company's behalf of
which it had, or should have had, knowledge, and such apparent authority is
limited by the character of the business. See also R. H. Kyle Furniture Co. v.
Russell Dry Goods Co., 340 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1960 ; Enterprise Foundry &
Machine Works v. Miners' Elkhorn Coal Co., 45 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1931).
189 See City of Whitesburg v. Whitesburg Water Co., 78 S.W.2d 330 (Ky.
1935) and cases cited therein; the unauthorized acts of officers or agents may be
ratified by the corporation by acquiescence, or by accepting and retaining the
benefits of the acts; Kentucky-Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Corp. v. Clark, 57 S.W.2d
65 (Ky. 1933), holding that unless the corporation has full knowledge of the
acts of its agents, it cannot be bound by ratification. See also Coldiron v. Good
Coal Co., 125 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1939). Contra, Kentucky By-Product Coal Co.
v. Cline, 265 S.W. 306 (Ky. 1924).
190 See McDowell v. Bauman, 224 S.W. 641 (Ky. 1920), which held that
although it has authorized an officer to sign checks, a coration is not estopped
to deny his authority when the person receiving the check is charged with notice
that it was given in payment of an obligation of a third person. See also
Montgomery Coal Corp. v. Riddle, 276 S.W. 975 (Ky. 1925).
'91 See McDowell v. Bauman, 224 S.W. 641 (Ky. 1920), which held that a
corporation which delays for nearly three years before denying the authority of anofficer to sign a certain check is not guilty of laches unless the delay operates to
the disadvantage of others.
192 KRSA § 271A.255. This provision is identical to ABA-ALI MOnEL Bus.
Copn. ACT § 51 (rev. ed. 1969).
193 KRS § 271.355(3).
194 See O'Neal v. F. A. Neider Co., 80 S.W. 451 (Ky. 1904), which held
that, in the absence of a contract, the board could remove an officer at any time
without cause.
195 See Harris v. Brown, 6 F.2d 922 (W.D. Ky. 1925), holding that a court
of equity cannot interfere with the board's removal of the president no matter
howharmfl such action may be to the corporation.
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expires.'9 6 Mere appointment or election by itself will not support
such an action, as there must be a valid contract in existence before
contract rights are created.
VI. INDEMNIFICATION
A. Indemnification of Officers, Directors, Employees,
and Agents-KRSA § 271A.025
The indemnification provision of the new act 197 presents several
highly significant changes from the previous statute.18 These pro-
visions place Kentucky among the most liberal of all jurisdictions
with regard to indemnification of officers and directors.
1. Third-Party Suits
The new provision readily distinguishes between liability resulting
from actions brought by third parties and actions by or in the
right of the corporation, commonly called derivative suits. KRSA §
271A.025(1) applies only to third-party actions in "any threatened,
pending, or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil,
criminal, administrative or investigative." Accordingly, indemnifica-
tion may be allowed at any stage of any type of third-party action.
The requirement of standing for persons allowed indemnification
is easily satisfied. Any person may be indemnified who was or is a
party to any of the above named actions,
by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, employe
[sic] or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request
of the corporation as a director, officer, employe [sic] or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise ...
The scope of indemnification in third-party actions is the broadest
possible, extending to expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments,
fines, and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred
in connection with the action. It is significant that compromise settle-
ments are included and that no court approval is required by the
statute.
Indemnification is permitted only where the person involved can
satisfy the standard-of-conduct requirements of this subsection. For
196 See MODEL Bus. Corn. Acr ANN. 2D § 51 II 2 (1971).
:19 KRSA § 271A.025. This provision is almost entirely identical to ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 5 (rev. ed. 1969) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145
(Supp. 1968).
198 KRS § 271.875.
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civil or administrative proceedings, the person must have "acted in
good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation." The phrase "or not
opposed to" is designed to cover actions arising out of acts done other
than in the capacity of officer or director, but arising by reason of
status as an officer or director. Thus, proceedings under the federal
securities acts for such things as violations of Rule 10b-5 or § 16(b),
or under state law for usurpation of a corporate opportunity, are
included within the scope of indemnification. 199 However, an ex-
tensive debate presently exists concerning whether indemnification
for federal securities acts violations is permissible, or whether such
indemnification would frustrate the public policy behind the securities
laws.200 At least one recent case has refused indemnification for an
underwriter found liable for knowing violations of the federal secu-
rities laws, 20' but there may be an implication here that indemnifica-
tion is permissible for mere negligent or careless securities acts viola-
tions.
Regarding criminal actions, the standard of conduct requires that
the person "had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was un-
lawful." The act further provides that the termination of any action
by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo
contendere, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person
did not act in accordance with the standards of conduct required by
this subsection. This provision is applicable to all actions whether
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative.
2. Derivative Actions
KRSA § 271A.025(2) grants the power of indemnification to the
corporation for actions by and in the right of the corporation. Any
threatened, pending, or completed action is included, and the same
persons are covered in derivative actions who are covered in third-
party actions. Indemnification in derivative suits extends only to
"expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred
by him in connection with the defense or settlement of such action
or suit." Thus, indemnification of any amount of a judgment or
199 See MoDE. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D § 5 I9 2 (1971).
200 See generally, Bishop & Arsht, Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under
State Statutes and Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAw. 120, 125 (Feb. 1972); Apple-
baum & McDowell Indemnification Against Securities Acts Liabilities, 27 Bus.
LAw. 181, 134 (Feb. 1972).
201 See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 897 U.S. 913 (1970).
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compromise settlement is not permitted. This is an important change
from the prior statute which permitted indemnification for such
amounts in derivative suits.
20 2
The standard of conduct required here is the same as that required
in third-party civil actions, i.e., conduct in good faith and in a manner
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation. However, there is one large exception. Indemnifica-
tion is not permitted where the person has been "adjudged to be
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty
to the corporation...." Thus, where the expense of defending a
derivative suit represents a significant amount, it would seem to be
wise for the director or officer to reach a compromise settlement if
there is a good chance he would be found liable for negligence or
misconduct. If he is so adjudged, the court in which the suit is
brought may determine that in view of-all the circumstances of the
case, the "person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for
such expenses which such court shall deem proper." There is, of
course, no assurance that the court will do this.
3. Successful Defenses
Were the director or officer is "successful on the merits or other-
wise" in defense of any action referred to in subsections (1) or (2),
he must be indemnified for his expenses (including attorneys' fees)
actually and reasonably incurred. Indemnification under this pro-
vision, subsection (3), is "mandatory," as the corporation enjoys no
discretion in deciding whether or not to indemnify the officer or
director for his expenses. In contrast, subsections (1) and (2) are
"permissive," as the person possesses no legal right to indemnification
unless it is ordered by the court under subsection (2).203
The phrase "or otherwise" in this subsection could present some
difficulty of interpretation as to what types of successful defenses,
other than on the merits, are included. Logically this would include
technical defenses such as the statute of limitations. However, other
defenses such as unclean hands of the plaintiff,204 and partial successes
202 KBS § 271.375(2). This section of the previous act has been roundly
criticized. Consider Professor Hornstein's comment: "A unique law passed the
Kentucky legislature: it provides for repaying to the director not only his expenses,
but 'any amount paid in compromise.' Can one imagine a more warped concept
of fiduciary responsibilityl" Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholder Derivative
Suits, 47 COLum. L. Rnv. 1, 10 (1947).2 03 See MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 2n § 5 11 2 (1971).
204 See Diamond v. Diamond, 120 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1954).
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such as dismissal of several counts of a criminal indictment but
conviction on other counts,205 have been held not to be included
within the scope of allowable indemnification for expenses.
4. Procedure for Indemnification; Exclusivity; and
Merged Corporations
The new act allows indemnification under subsections (1) or (2)
only where the director or officer has met the applicable standard
of conduct set forth in those two subsections, unless indemnification
is ordered by a court. The determination as to whether the person
has met this standard of conduct is governed by subsection (4), which
permits the determination to be made by (a) the board of directors
by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not
parties to the action or (b) the shareholders. A third method of
determination included in the Model Act but omitted from the Ken-
tucky version, permits independent legal counsel to make the deter-
mination in a written opinion. Several writers have doubted the
practical independence of such counsel,206 and apparently the Ken-
tucky legislature has agreed.
Of the two alternative methods available in this section, the
board-of-directors method is probably the safer and easier one to
follow. However, where the whole board is named in the suit, or
where enough directors are parties so that a disinterested quorum is
unobtainable, the shareholders will have to make the determination.
For the larger corporation covered by the SEC proxy rules, this
means a full disclosure to the shareholders of all facets of the pro-
ceeding. Surely this could prove embarrassing to the director or
officer involved, but it may be the only course available.
Subsection (5) permits the corporation to advance the expenses,
including attorneys' fees, to the person involved in any proceeding
under this section, if authorized in the manner provided in subsection
(4). The receipt of an undertaking to repay the corporation by the
person involved, unless it is ultimately determined that he is entitled
205 See Merritt-Chapman & Scott v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1970). Note that decisions of the Delaware courts on indemnification may have
considerable application to the new Kentucky provision as the two statutes are
practically identical.
206 See e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks; New Trends in In-
demnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YAI.E L.J. 1078 (1968). For
a more favorable view of indemnification statutes generally, see Sebring, Recent
Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and
Others, 23 Bus. LAw. 95 (1967).
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to indemnification, is a condition precedent to the advancement of
expenses.
Indemnification under this section is expressly made not exclusive
of any other rights of indemnification to which the person may be
entitled "under any by-law, agreement, vote of shareholders or dis-
interested directors or otherwise...." The actual effect of the non-
exclusivity clause of subsection (6) is not exactly clear,20 7 although
it has been suggested that it would be proper to insert a provision
into the by-laws making mandatory any permissive indemnification
allowed. 208 Subsection (8) insures that indemnification will extend
to directors and officers of merged corporations by defining "the cor-
poration" to include all constituent corporations absorbed in a con-
solidation or merger.
5. Liability Insurance
In a somewhat controversial provision, subsection (7) of the new
act allows a corporation to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf
of covered persons "... . against any liability asserted against him and
incurred by him in any such capacity or arising out of his status as
such... ." As previously noted, the "arising out of his status" phrase
is directly aimed at Rule 10b-5 or § 16(b) violations, thus raising
serious policy considerations concerning indemnification for securities
acts violations. Additionally, insurance coverage is permitted "...
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify
him against such liability under the provisions of this section." The
previous practice of the corporation's sharing the cost of the insurance
with the person covered is no longer necessary, as the corporation
may now pay the full cost of such insurance.
20 9
C. Kent Hatfield
207 See Bishop, supra note 206, at 1085 for the following excerpts:
Nobody knew what the clause meant in the old statutes, and if anyone
knows what it means in the new ones, he has not published the informa-
tion .... If the few cases in which the issue has been presented are
any guide, the courts will not be overly eager to find in the non-exclusive
clause authority for the indemnification of executives who have breached
their duty to the corporation.208 See Klink, Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under State Statutes and
Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAw. 109, 115 (1972).
209 For articles dealing with liability insurance policies and indemnification
insurance generally, see -insey, DeLancey, Stahl, & Kramer, What Existing D
& 0 Policies Cover, 27 Bus. LAw. 147 (Feb. 1972); Hinsey and DeLancey,
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance-An Approach to Its Evaluation and a
Checklist, 23 Bus. LAw. 869 (1968); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate
Executives, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 648 (1967); Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment:
Insurance Against Directors' and Officers Liability, 22 Bus. LAw. 92 (1966).
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